Do mandated changes in accounting policy result in the reapportionment of executive equity compensation? This research addresses how accounting policy change motivated firms to substitute restricted stock awards (RSAs) and other equity compensation for ESOs. Firms that overweighted options in their compensation structure are shown to utilize the implementation of FAS 123R as a deadline to reduce ESOs. The evidence does not support that accelerating firms are managing option expense to minimize management option compensation costs.
Introduction
Is there is a linkage between a significant revision in accounting policies and the reapportionment of executive equity compensation? How do FAS 123R changes motivate firms to alter their optimal compensation contracts? This research tries to provide evidence to answer these questions. Previous studies by Hall and Murphy (2002) , Lambert and Larcker (2004) and Oyer and Schaefer (2005) have tried to provide these answers. Unfortunately, their theoretical models demonstrate different and conflicting predictions about this linkage. Further, and importantly for this research, prior empirical research provides inconclusive evidence on the linkage between accounting policy and option usage. Hall and Murphy (2002) suggest that favorable accounting treatment for options (under FAS 123) motivated the overweighting of options and the underweighting of restricted stock awards (RSAs). Similarly, Lynch (2003, 2005) , suggest that accounting considerations may motivate firms to alter option contract terms. However, Yermack (1995) and Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (2000) do not find a reliable relation between options usage and financial reporting.
This mixed evidence has led to a call for further research directly examining the effects of accounting policy changes on the use of options (Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) ). Core et al. specifically state that "It is important for future research to examine the role of accounting in motivating firms to either increase or decrease their use of stock options … the role of financial accounting for employee stock options is of a considerable importance to firms, but it is not well understood by economists" (pg. 42).
In an attempt to provide an answer, this paper examines the role of accounting and how changes in accounting standards with regard to the treatment of ESOs impact the design and structure of management compensation. The change in accounting standards is examined and compares option disclosure (in footnotes) under FAS 123 to income statement recognition under FAS 123R. The specific question addressed is whether this change motivates management and boards to alter management compensation structure toward a more optimal and efficient compensation contract. Firms with a high degree of financial reporting concerns 1 are examined to find if they accelerate the vesting of ESOs before the imminent implementation deadline of FAS 123R, in an attempt to alter the compensation structure away from options and into other forms of compensation.
Companies with a high degree of financial reporting concerns, and who decide to accelerate vesting of ESOs, provide a natural setting in which to investigate the role of accounting in motivating firms to move toward optimal compensation contracts, without having to rely on a proxy. A decrease in the use of options once the deadline is passed would be consistent with unfavorable accounting treatment, discouraging the use of options and moving towards other forms of compensation. This evidence would support the assertion that changes in accounting policies do affect the design and the structure of executive compensation contracts. Carter, Lynch and Tuna (2007) examine the role of accounting in CEO equity compensation using a sample of expensing firms as a proxy for financial reporting concerns. However, in this research we contend that examining accelerating firms provides better evidence, relative to expensing firms. Accelerators are likely to be more sensitive and more aggressive in their response to financial reporting concerns and to changes in financial reporting requirements. This fact is evident by their affirmative actions to alter option contracts before the FAS 123R deadline, under a climate characterized by greater scrutiny of management actions by capital markets, investors, regulators and standard setters. Accelerators are typically heavy users of options and they have chosen not to expense voluntarily until it becomes imminent to do so. For these firms, the decision to accelerate vesting before FAS 123R becomes effective demonstrates a high level of concern about financial reporting costs.
There are additional reasons that support the superiority of examining accelerators rather than expensing firms. First, the voluntary nature of the expensing decision is questionable as it was probably clear to firms that expensing would eventually be mandatory. Second, financial reporting concerns may not have been the main driver to expense. Instead, the expensing decision could be driven by motives such as capitalizing on positive publicity, given the negative political climate towards 'excessive' executive compensation in 2002 and 2003 2 . This would be especially true for companies with no or little options in their compensation structure. Additionally, the decision could be driven by "moral persuasion" or pressure from governmental agencies such as the Federal Reserve Bank in their attempts to restore confidence in the capital market. Accelerating firms provide a superior sample to examine the role of accounting and financial reporting and how it motivates firms to alter their compensation structures.
Changes in accounting policies and accounting standards with regard to management's compensation contracts, the firm's response to these changes, and the framework or the theory explaining firm reaction are issues of paramount importance to the areas of accounting, finance and business in general. This research attempts to make several contributions to these disciplines. First, the paper provides an answer to the question of how changes in accounting standards motivate firms to alter their compensation structure toward more optimal and efficient compensation contracts. This is accomplished by examining whether firms with a high degree of financial reporting concerns, i.e. companies who accelerate the vesting of ESOs alter their compensation structure away from options towards other forms of compensation, like restricted stock awards.
Second, within the framework of contracting theory, this paper develops the optimal contracting hypothesis as a new explanation of firms' decisions to accelerate the vesting of ESOs. According to this hypothesis, the implementation of FAS 123R will impact existing 'optimal' compensation contracts. Companies which overweighted (underweighted) options (restricted stock awards), and firms with a large percentage of options, especially those that are underwater, are more likely to have an optimal compensation structure that is seriously violated by FAS 123R. They are expected to respond by moving toward a more optimal compensation structure under the new regime by accelerating, thereby decreasing option-based compensation and increasing RSAs. On the other hand, for companies with relatively fewer options, the implementation of FAS 123R is less likely to impact their optimal compensation structure and they are less likely to accelerate. Thus, the optimal contracting hypothesis provides an explanation to why some firms accelerate vesting while others choose not to.
Finally, this paper examines the market reaction to the accelerating announcements and the determinants of the market response. The analysis focuses on whether the company discloses that acceleration is part of a strategy to reduce, eliminate, or substitute options with other forms of compensation components, particularly restricted stock awards.
The findings of this study show that first, acceleration of option vesting is not utilized to manage the recognition of option expenses so that the impact of the cost of management's option compensation on the balance sheet is minimized or is made less apparent to stockholders. Second, accelerating firms with relatively large stock option proportions, compared to restricted stock awards, employed the FAS 123R implementation deadline as an opportunity to substitute RSAs for ESOs and achieve an optimal compensation structure that reduces agency costs. Finally, the findings indicate that acceleration is also undertaken to increase the economic benefits of increased retention and positive motivational value of stock options.
Review and Discussion of Related Literature
Concurrent to this study, Choudhary, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2006) investigate the factors associated with firms' decisions to accelerate the vesting ESOs and the market reaction to these announcements. They find that the likelihood of accelerating is higher for firms that can avoid larger option expenses and for firms with greater agency problems. Choudary et al. conclude that the motive to accelerate the vesting of ESOs is to avoid recognizing the unamortized future fair value of ESO expenses In contrast to Choudray et al., Balsam, Reitenga and Yin (2008) examine the market reaction and the determinants of accelerating announcements. They report a positive and significant market reaction to these announcements, which they attribute to benefits associated with the avoidance of ESO expenses.
However, there are several reasons to believe that the motive for the acceleration of vesting options goes beyond simply avoiding recognition of the option expense. First, from a capital-market perspective, these costs should be capitalized in share prices in a manner causing investors to be indifferent between recognition and disclosure. Second, the magnitude of the unamortized future fair value of ESO expense in absolute dollar terms and relative to the market value of equity is insignificant for most firms. Relative to market values of equity of all accelerators, these cost savings represent only 0.64 percent and this would seem to be an insufficient motive to accelerate vesting. Third, 19 percent of these firms also accelerate the vesting of in-the-money options. Acceleration of in-the-money options results in recognition of option expense under FAS 123 and does not produce any cost savings. Fourth, most of the accelerated options are deeply underwater options, typical option pricing models will generate a comparatively small expense. Finally, a recent study by the Corporate Executive Board (2005), indicates the reasons disclosed for accelerating vesting are: First, elimination or reduction of a stock option program; second, improving employee morale; and third, investor concerns about employeeowned equity. These factors all suggest that the decision to accelerate is part of a process to eliminate or reduce stock option programs as part of the compensation structure adjustment to FAS 123R. Carter et al. (2007) utilize expensing firms to examine the role of accounting rules in the design of CEO equity compensation. They find that financial reporting concerns are positively related to stock options and total compensation and negatively related to the use of restricted stock. This suggests that the previously-available accounting treatment (under FAS 123) has influenced equity compensation. In addition, they examine the change in CEO compensation for expensing firms and find that firms reduce their option use and increase their restricted stock use after expensing, but exhibit no decrease in total compensation. They suggest that favorable accounting treatment for options leads to a higher use of options and a lower use of restricted stock awards. In the spirit of Carter et al. (2007) , Brown and Lee (2007) examine changes in executive equity compensation around the issuance of FAS 123R. They find that companies that cut back on the use of ESOs are those with tighter earnings-based debt covenants, a greater tendency to use ESOs, favorable accounting treatment to achieve earning benchmarks, weaker corporate governance and accelerated vesting of outstanding ESOs in the pre-FAS 123R period. In addition, they find that increased use of restricted stock does not account entirely for the lost ESO compensation. To complement their research this study also extends this post-FAS 123R substitution effect to other compensation components beyond RSAs.
Development of Testable Hypothesis

Management-of-Financial-Reporting Hypothesis
The management-of-financial-reporting hypothesis acknowledges that by accelerating underwater options prior to the effective date of FAS 123R, a company is allowed to avoid expensing/recognizing the fair value of options granted in their income statement. Instead, the company will act under FAS 123 and disclose the unamortized fair value of the accelerated options in the financial statement footnotes in the period in which the option vesting is accelerated. From management prospective, this amount represents an avoided expense, or a "cost saving" and will cause reported net income to be higher over the remaining vesting period, relative to a company that decides not to accelerate 3 . Hypothesis 1 is: Firms with a higher degree of financial reporting concerns are expected to be more likely to accelerate the vesting of their underwater ESOs.
Three proxy variables are utilized to develop evidence for Hypothesis 1. The first variable is the option expense avoided (EXPAVDEQ) 4 . The second variable is financial leverage (LEV) and it is designed to account for non-violation of debt covenants as a motive for managing reported earnings through acceleration. The proxy employed (ISSUE) is a dummy variable equal to one, if the company issued debt or equity in the previous three fiscal years and is zero otherwise. Hypothesis 1 suggests a positive relation between EXPAVDEQ, LEV, and ISSUE and the likelihood of accelerating.
Optimal-Contracting Hypothesis
This research develops an alternative to the management-of-financial-reporting as a rationale for acceleration. The optimal-contracting hypothesis suggests that firm response to accounting policy changes has economic consequences impacting firm value. Executive compensation contracts involve a delicate balance between incentive and risk. To properly align the interests of management and the shareholders, an efficient contract must achieve a high level of motivation while avoiding the imposition of excessive risk on managers. The pre-FAS 123R accounting treatment of ESOs assigned zero accounting costs to ESOs rather than their much higher economic fair value costs and was driven by preserving accounting profits. This preferential treatment resulted in two consequences with significant implications for compensation contracts. First, Hall and Murphy (2003) and Brown and Lee (2007) argue that boards got involved in a costly process of overweighting options at the expense of other compensation components. Second, boards acted as if ESOs were cheaper than their economic cost, resulting in more ESOs being granted. Mandated expensing under FAS 123R eliminated most of the accounting appeal of options and raised ESO accounting costs to their approximate fair values. This aspect made boards far more appreciative of their cost and shareholders much more cognizant of corporate generosity. Thus, mandatory expensing will significantly alter the balance of compensation contracts away from ESOs towards other forms of compensation. Boards and management are thereby motivated to re-examine the level and structure of management compensation and make adjustments to return to an optimal compensation structure 6 .
Accelerated vesting converts the future cost of unvested options into a one-time footnotedisclosure as part of the process to achieve an optimal compensation structure. It may represent a decision by the board and management to reduce or even eliminate stock options as part of an adjustment in response to new accounting rules. However, rational CEOs and other managers are unlikely to accept a permanent reduction in their total compensation and will seek to substitute other forms of compensation for these options. This explanation is consistent with the notion that accounting rules play a major role in motivating firms to move towards optimal compensation structures that will enhance firm value. It is also consistent with the assertion that there are economic consequences that result from financial reporting. This logic leads to Hypothesis 2: Firms with compensation structures that are more heavily weighted with stock options (prior to implementation of FAS 123R) are expected to make a significant change in compensation structure by increasing the proportion of restricted stock awards at the expense of stock options as part of the total pay package.
Hypothesis 2 provides an explanation as to why firms with over-weighted options accelerate vesting. while underweighted-option firms choose not to accelerate. In contrast, hypothesis 1 does not explain why non-accelerating firms choose not to accelerate vesting to attain the accounting benefits of one-time footnote disclosure, even when they have both in-the-money and out-of-the money options as part of their compensation packages.
5 Studies such as Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2002) suggest that executives value ESO grants far below their economic cost to the company because executives are risk averse and cannot perfectly hedge the risk imposed by ESOs. Firms providing more ESOs must compensate managers for this increased risk and reduced diversification, resulting in greater overall executive pay. In addition, Hall and Murphy (2002) report that firms conducting explicit exchange of cash for stock-based compensation typically gave participating managers a risk premium for accepting stock-based compensation, with the ESO risk premium nearly double that of restricted stock. This suggests that ESOs are a more expensive form of compensation relative to other components.
Eight proxy variables are utilized to provide evidence upon hypothesis 2 with regard to the likelihood of accelerating option vesting. Six variables address issues related to the ESOs, RSAs, bonuses and the substitution of RSAs for stock options. Two variables represent management ownership and board independence. The first variable is the percentage of option value to total compensation 7 (BSVTC). The second variable is the ratio of restricted stock awards (ExecuComp RSTKGRNT variable) to total compensation (RSATC). The third variable (RSAOP) relates RSAs to stock options. Hypothesis 2 predicts a significant decline (increase) in BSVTC (RSATC) for all firms in the post-FAS 123R period, relative to the pre-FAS 123R period. Companies with a higher ratio of RSAOP are projected to be less likely to be involved in substitution, and thereby accelerate vesting. Further, companies with an optimal compensation structure, such as the high-tech and health-care sectors, which (pre-FAS 123R) called for an over-weighting (under-weighting) of options (restricted stock awards) are more likely to substitute options with restricted stock awards. Thus, they are expected to be more likely to accelerate option vesting. Additionally, a dummy variable is included and used to indicate whether a firm has chosen to expense their options (DEXPEN) prior to the implementation of required expensing under FAS 123R. This variable takes the value of one for voluntary expensers and zero otherwise. A negative relationship between this variable and the likelihood of accelerating for firms is expected.
The ratio of cash bonus to total current compensation (BONCC) is also employed to serve as a proxy for this hypothesis. Companies with a higher percentage of shares held by management and the board (PSHROWN) and a higher percentage of independent board members (DIRINDEP) are more likely to accelerate. PSHROWN is the percentage of shares held by the top five executives and board members. DIRINDEP is the percentage of the independent board members. One additional variable is used to address the characteristics of accelerating firm. DCHANGE is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the accelerating company reported in its announcement that acceleration is specifically part of a strategy to alter the compensation structure and is zero otherwise. A positive relationship is expected between this variable and the market's reaction to the announcement.
Positive Economic-Benefits Hypothesis
The positive economic-benefits hypothesis developed by Murphy (2000 Murphy ( , 2003 and Balachandran, Carter and Lynch (2006) suggests that options lose their economic incentive and retention value once the stock price falls sufficiently below the exercise price. If this happens, executives perceive little chance of being able to exercise the options 8 . Management and the boards of accelerating firms frequently adopted this argument as the stated motive for their decision. They argued that the expense associated with these options would be disproportionately high compared to the perceived value to the employees 9 . Hypothesis 3 is then: Firms with a relatively greater percentage of unvested and unexercised options that are underwater are expected to be more likely to accelerate the vesting of their options.
As the first proxy for this hypothesis, the relative amount that the option is in, at, or out-of-themoney is employed. This variable (IVMP) is calculated as the intrinsic value (S-X) scaled by the market price (S). The second proxy is the extent to which options are underwater (EXTUW). A negative relation 7 Total compensation is defined as the total of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, the Black-Scholes fair value of option grants, restricted stock awards, long-term investment plans and all other compensation. 8 Balachandran et al. (2006) examine changes in executive compensation firms make in response to underwater options. Firms taking such actions claim they do so to restore incentives from market-wide or industry-wide factors beyond their control. Their results support the argument that restoring incentives and retaining executives seems to be the primary drivers of firms' responses to underwater options.
is anticipated between both IVPM and EXTUW and the likelihood to accelerate under this hypothesis, since options more deeply underwater provide less economic motivation and retention incentives. The third proxy variable is the percentage of options granted to all other employees (PCTTOEMP) who are not one of the top five executives. In contrast to the other two proxy variables for this hypothesis, a positive relation is expected between PCTTOEMP and the likelihood to accelerate, since a relatively greater number of vested options for all other employees should enhance motivation and retention.
DRESTR is utilized as a proxy variable that is equal to one if a company restricts the exercisability of the accelerated options until the original vesting period and is zero otherwise. A positive relationship between DRESTR and market reaction is expected under hypothesis 3. These firms presumably include these restrictions to ensure the retention of valuable employees and to enhance employee morale. The second accelerating-firm variable under this hypothesis is closely related to the previously-developed PCTTOEMP variable. PEMOA is a proxy for the percentage of accelerated options held by the (non-top five executive) employees as compared to all accelerated options. Under this hypothesis, a positive relationship is expected between PEMOA and market reaction if the acceleration is done to increase rank-and-file employee motivation and retention rather than simply increase topmanagement rewards.
Control Variables
Finally, four control variables are employed. Two variables are employed to control for industry and firm size. First, start-up companies with cash constraints but large potential upside tend to overweight the percentage of options in their compensation structure. Both high-tech and health-care companies (HTHC) may be characterized as such. High-tech and health-care companies are more likely to accelerate in attempts to reduce or even eliminate options and substitute other forms of compensation for them. Thus, a positive relation is anticipated between HTHC and the likelihood to accelerate. The HTHC proxy is constructed as an indicator variable equal to one if the company is in the high-tech or health-care sector and is zero otherwise. The natural log of market value of equity (LMVEQ) is utilized as a proxy to control for firm size. Sesil and Kroumova (2005) and Kruse (1993) find that large firms with ESO plans generate higher productivity gains from their employees relative to smaller firms. Thus, large firms are less likely to substitute a large portion of their options with restricted stock awards, and therefore are expected to be less likely to accelerate.
The other two control variables account for annual firm profitability (ROE) and historical financial performance (MTB), effectively measuring market value added. As these variables are meant to control for other factors impacting upon the hypotheses examined, no sign is predicted.
Data and Sample Description and Methods of Analysis
A final sample of 453 companies used to estimate the market reaction to the announcement of vesting acceleration. The control group includes 1122 firm, or 4488 firm-year, observations. Panel A of Table 1 reports details regarding the initial sample and the reason for deletion to reach the final sample. Panel B provides a frequency distribution for the accelerating and control group samples by industry affiliation. Table 1 indicates that accelerators belonging to primary metal manufacturing, information, and scientific and technical services are significantly over-represented relative to the control group. High-tech companies make up a majority of each of these groups.
A logistic regression is used to differentiate between the proposed hypotheses with regard to management motives associated with this activity. Abnormal returns around the acceleration announcement are estimated using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model as the return-generating process. The coefficients of the model are estimated from an OLS regression. The Table 1 Initial Sample, Reasons for Deletion and Frequency Distribution by Industry Panel A presents the initial sample and the reason for deletion. Panel B presents a frequency distribution of the final sample based upon the first two digits of the 2007 North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS). N is the number of observations within each group and % is the percentage of the observations relative to the total number of observations in the final sample. na indicates not applicable. 
CAAR
Both the rank z-test and the jackknife z-test are utilized to test for the level of significance of the AAR and the CAAR. A cross-sectional regression model is developed to provide additional evidence upon the three hypotheses and to explain the determinants of market reaction. The cross-sectional regression model and the variables employed are fully depicted in Table 5 .
Table 3 Summary Statistics and Univariate Tests for Selected Relevant Variables
EXPAVD is the dollar amount of option expense avoided as a result of acceleration (M indicates millions). EXPAVDEQ is the option expense avoided as a result of acceleration divided by the market value of equity (MVE). LEV is the degree of financial leverage calculated as current plus long-term debt divided by total assets. PSHROWN is the proportion of all shares owned by management and board members. DIRINDEP is the proportion of independent members on the board of directors. IVMP is the average of the intrinsic value of options granted divided by the market price per share. PCTTOEMP is the proportion of options granted to all (non-top five executive) employees. ROE is return on equity calculated as net income divided by the book value of equity (BVE). MTB is MVE divided by BVE. MVEQ is the market value of equity. POACEL is the proportion of options accelerated relative to total options outstanding. NACCEL is the number of options accelerated. EXEOP is the number of options accelerated held by executives. EMOP is the number of options accelerated held by (nontop five executive) employees. PEXOA is the proportion of accelerated options held by top-five executives. PEMOA is the proportion of accelerated options held by (non top-five executive) employees. DUR is the average number of years left until vesting for accelerated options. Table 2 presents univariate statistical analysis of management compensation before and after FAS 123R for the sample of 650 accelerating firms and 1122 non-accelerating control firms.
Empirical Results
The results indicate that a change in accounting policy from FAS 123 to FAS 123R motivated management and boards to shift compensation structure away from stock options toward restricted stock awards and other current compensation. This change in compensation structure is significantly more pronounced for accelerating firms than it is for the control group. These univariate results provide preliminary evidence consistent with the optimal-contracting hypothesis. Firms are being motivated to move toward an optimal or more efficient contract structure. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the remainder of the variables used in the logistic and cross-sectional regression analysis, for both the accelerating and control groups. The level of significance of the difference between the two group's means and medians was determined using the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test statistics. Table 3 provides consistent (mean and median) evidence supporting the optimal-contracting hypothesis based on both the PSHROWN and DIRINDEP variables. The univariate analysis shown in Table 3 also supports the positive-economic-benefits hypothesis. It also indicates that accelerators are significantly smaller in size than the control group. The evidence presented in table 3 is consistent with the economic-benefits hypothesis based on the following: Unvested, underwater options have little motivational or retention-increasing value. A higher percentage of both options granted and accelerated options are held by employees, compared to top-five executives. If acceleration is done to increase the motivational and retention benefits, the options that are accelerated will be predominately underwater options. Table 4 reports the results of the logistic regression analysis. Subsection A reports the results for variables representing the management-of-financial-reporting hypothesis. The EXPAVDEQ is positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 percent level, suggests that companies with greater option expenses avoided are more likely to accelerate vesting. Contrary to expectations developed under this hypothesis, the signs of LEV and ISSUE are negative and ISSUE is significant at the 0.10 percent level in all three models. These are not consistent with the notion that acceleration is motivated by a firms' desire to avoid violation of debt covenants and/or to enhance their access to capital markets. Subsection B presents the logistic regression results for the optimal-contracting hypothesis. These results suggest that companies that overweighted (underweighted) options (restricted stock awards) are more likely to accelerate. Further, they are attempting to replace options with other types of compensation, including restricted stock awards. The results are consistent with the optimal-contracting hypothesis developed earlier, indicating there are economic benefits associated with the decision to accelerate. Subsection B also suggests that firms electing to expense options are less likely to be accelerators. The BONCC parameter estimate is negative and statistically significant, which suggests that firms accelerating vesting are not motivated by management's desire to increase bonuses. Actually, a negative and significant sign is consistent with a trade-off between compensation structure components. It suggests that companies that grant more options tend to give less bonuses. As such, a negative and significant BONCC provides evidence that companies with fewer options, and thereby more in bonuses, are less likely to accelerate vesting. Further, both PSHROWN and DIRINDEP are positive and significant as predicted under this hypothesis. This is supportive of the proposition that acceleration decisions are not motivated by management and board desire to enhance their private benefits or because these companies lack effective corporate governance structures. Therefore, the findings in this subsection are uniformly consistent with the optimal-contracting hypothesis.
Subsection C of Table 4 shows the logistic regression results for the variables representing the positive-economic benefits hypothesis. These results provide consistent support for the positive-economic benefits associated with accelerating vesting. The logistic regression model is shown above. The independent variable is ACCEL, which equals one if the company accelerated vesting of employee stock options and is zero if they did not. EXPAVDEQ is the option expense avoided as a result of acceleration scaled by market value of equity (MVE). LEV is the degree of financial leverage calculated as current plus long-term debt divided by total assets. ISSUE is a dummy variable that equals one if the company has issued debt or equity in the 2002-2004 period and is zero otherwise. BSVTC is the Black-Scholes value of option grants divided by total compensation. RSATC is the value of restricted stock awards divided by total compensation. RSAOP equals restricted stock awards relative to BSVTC option awards. DEXPEN is a dummy variable equal to one if the company is expensing the fair value of options (prior to the implementation of FAS 123R) and is zero otherwise. BONCC is the annual bonus divided by current compensation. PSHROWN is the percentage of shares owned by management and board members. DIRINDEP is the percentage of independent members on the board of directors. IVMP is the average of the intrinsic value of options granted divided by the market price per share. EXTUW is the extent to which the unvested options are underwater. PCTTOEMP is the percentage of options granted to all (non top-five executive) employees. HTHC is a dummy variable equaling one if the company belongs to the high-tech or health-care sectors and is zero otherwise. LMVEQ is the natural log of MVE. ROE is return on equity calculated as net income divided by book value of equity (BVE). MTB is MVE divided by BVE. ε is the standard error of the regression. Z-Stat is the z-test statistic indicating if the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero. na indicates not applicable. 10 One may argue that IVMP and EXTUW could serve as proxies for the amount of option expense avoided on the grounds that under FAS 123, if the company accelerates vesting of in-the-money options, the company needs to recognize the fair value of these options as an expense. As such, there are no accounting benefits associated with accelerating vesting of in-the-money options, although such benefits are associated with accelerating vesting of underwater options. As a result, the more underwater options a firm has, the more likely the firm is to accelerate. However, this argument has doubtful validity for the following two reasons: First, an option does not need to be deeply underwater for the company to be able to avoid recognition. An option only needs to be at-the-money to give the company the ability to disclose the expense and avoid recognition; and second, the B-S value, and thereby the option expense, is a positive function of share price. Thus, the more deeply underwater the option is, the lower its value and the lower the amount of expense recognized. The results are more consistent with these proxies as providing support for the economic-benefits hypothesis than they are proxies for the management-offinancial-reporting expense hypothesis. The control variables in the logistic regression show that companies in the hi-tech and health-care sectors are more likely to accelerate. This result can be attributed to the unique nature of these two sectors, where firms tend to rely more heavily on options as a form of compensation. Accelerators are significantly smaller and have stronger historical financial performance.
Variable
The market reaction to accelerated vesting announcements is also examined to further validate the preceding analysis. The results are reported in Table 5 , Panel A. Further, the determinants of this market reaction are analyzed using a cross-sectional regression and the results are reported in Panel B.
However, to provide further evidence upon the optimal-contracting hypothesis, the accelerating firms are split into sub-groups on the basis of whether they disclosed that acceleration was undertaken as part of a strategy to change their compensation structure by reducing, eliminating or substituting options with RSAs or other compensation components. The results in Table 5 are consistent with the optimalcontracting hypothesis in that the market apparently perceives acceleration to be part of an optimization strategy undertaken to achieve a more efficient contract structure and enhance employee morale, and thereby firm value.
Panel B reports the results of the cross-sectional analysis. Subsection A shows that the EXPAVDEQ parameter estimate is negative. It is marginally significant at the 10 percent level in Model 1, although it is not significant in Model 2. These results are contrary to the expectations under the management-of-financial-reporting hypothesis. Rather, they suggest that investors already incorporate these scaled, option expense savings into their estimate of share prices.
Subsection B indicates that RSAOP is negative, as anticipated under the optimal-contracting hypothesis, and is statistically significant. This suggests a higher market reaction for accelerators with a lower ratio of RSAs relative to options (options were overweighted) and who are more likely to substitute restricted stock awards for ESOs. PSHROWN is positive and statistically significant in both models. This suggests that accelerating firms with a higher percentage of shares owned by management and board members prior to FAS 123R are more likely to accelerate for the purpose of reaching a new optimal contract that will reduce the agency problem in response to new accounting policy. This result is thereby consistent with the optimal-contracting hypothesis. DCHANGE is positive and statistically significant in both models. This result suggests that the market attaches a higher valuation to accelerators with the intention to reduce, eliminate or underweight options in their compensation structures, also consistent with the optimal-contracting hypothesis. Subsection C shows that the proxies for the positive-economic-benefits hypothesis from acceleration, IVMP, DRESTR and PEMOA, are all positive as predicted and statistically significant. This argument suggests that the more deeply underwater options are, the lower their incentive and retention ability. Thus, the cost of these options is disproportionate compared to their perceived value to the employee. IVMP is positive and significant, thus acceleration to restore employee morale is associated with a positive valuation effect. This is consistent with the positive-economic-benefits hypothesis. Management and boards of accelerating firms whose motives are to restore employee morale and to maintain incentive and retention functions, rather than enhance their private benefits, are more likely to restrict exercisability. DRESTR is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the capital market places a higher value on accelerators who restrict the exercisability of options, consistent with the positive-economic-benefits hypothesis. PEMOA, the percentage of accelerated options held by employees, is positive and significant. This suggests that firms choosing to accelerate options held largely by employees, relative to the top-five executives, are more likely to be interested in incentivizing employees. Table 5 Results of the Event Study and Cross-Sectional Analysis Panel A: The mean and median cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) percent over the three-day announcement window from day t-1 through day t+1 utilizing the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model as the abnormal return generating process are depicted in this panel. Panel B: This panel shows the results of a cross-sectional analysis of the market reaction. The regression model is shown above. The dependent variable is the three-day average abnormal return (CAAR3). EXPAVDEQ is the option expense avoided as a result of acceleration divided by market value of equity. RSAOP equals the restricted stock awards relative to the value of the Black-Scholes options. DEXPEN is a dummy variable equal to one if the company has expensed options (prior to FAS 123R's implementation) and is zero otherwise. BONCC is the annual cash bonus divided by total current compensation. PSHROWN is the percentage of shares held by executives and board members. DIRINDEP is the percentage of independent board members relative to all board members. DCHANGE is a dummy variable equaling one if the company discloses that acceleration is done to alter compensation structure away from options and is zero otherwise. IVMP is the intrinsic value of options divided by the five-day average market price preceding the announcement day. DRESTR is a dummy variable equal to one if the company restricts the exercisability of the accelerated options until the options reach their original vesting date and is zero otherwise. PEMOA is the percentage of accelerated options held by (non top-five executive) employees. HTHC is a dummy variable equal to one if the company is in the hi-tech or health-care sector and is zero otherwise. ε is the standard error of the regression. 
Summary and Conclusions
This research examines the link between changes in accounting policy and the reapportionment of equity compensation in management contracts. Specifically, if such a link exists, how do these changes motivate firms to alter their optimal compensation contracts?
The univariate analysis results regarding compensation indicate that the change in accounting policy from FAS 123 to FAS 123R motivates management and boards to alter compensation structure away from stock options and toward restricted stock awards and other current compensation. This change in compensation structure is significantly more pronounced for accelerating firms than for the control group. Further, the univariate analysis indicates that the percentage of stock owned by management and board members, as well as the percentage of outside board members, is significantly higher for accelerating firms than non-accelerators. All of these results are consistent with acceleration undertaken to minimize agency costs, as suggested by the optimal-contracting hypothesis. Options of accelerating firms are found to be significantly more deeply underwater. Accelerating firms also grant more options to rank-and-file employees than do their non-accelerating counterparts. Thus, the positive-economic-benefits hypothesis is supported by this analysis.
The logistic regression results indicate that companies displaying the following characteristics are more likely to accelerate the vesting of ESOs: overweighted (underweighted) options (restricted stock awards), a higher percentage of underwater options, a higher percentage of options held by employees, smaller company size, operating in the hi-tech or health-care sector, and a larger amount of option expense. These results are consistent with the argument that for accelerators, the cost of accelerated options does not justify their incentive and retention functions, as evidenced by higher option expenses. This motivates these companies to move toward more optimal and efficient compensation contracts in an effort to restore the incentives and increase employee morale. Conversely, the results do not support the management-of-financial-reporting hypothesis that acceleration is undertaken to enhance the private benefits of management and the board, nor do the results provide evidence that a lack of effective corporate governance structure leads to the acceleration of option vesting.
The results of the market reaction and cross-sectional analysis suggest that the market rewards companies that initiated acceleration as a strategy to move toward an optimal and efficient compensation structure contract by eliminating, decreasing, and/or substituting restricted stock awards for stock options, in response to the implementation of FAS 123R. Further, the analysis suggests that acceleration was undertaken to generate positive economic benefits in the form of increased motivational and retention benefits. Conversely, the results do not support the hypothesis that acceleration is motivated by efforts to manage financial reporting for the private benefit of these firms' managements and boards of directors.
The interpretation of the findings offers three conclusions as to why firms chose to accelerate the vesting of their options prior to the implementation of FAS 123R, which requires expensing of stock option expense rather than the footnote recognition required under FAS 123. First, acceleration is not undertaken to manage option expense recognition so that management option compensation costs are minimized or made less visible to shareholders. Second, the accelerating firms that overweighted options in their compensation structure utilize the implementation of FAS 123R as a deadline to make changes in the relative ESO versus RSA components, in an attempt to achieve a more optimal compensation structure. Finally, the evidence also indicates that firms accelerate to increase the motivational and retention attributes of employee stock options, which is presumably why such options were part of the compensation package in the first place. SALARY is the average annual salary. Note: for each of the variables in the table the numbers shown in parentheses below the upper row of numbers represent the medians. BONUS is the average annual cash bonus. OPTIONS is the Black-Scholes' value of options granted. RSA is the amount of restricted stock awards. TC is the total compensation defined as the sum of the current plus equity compensation. CCTC is the percentage of current compensation to total compensation. ECTC is the percentage of equity compensation to total compensation. BSVTC is the percentage of B-S option value to total compensation. RSATC is the percentage of restricted stock awards to total compensation. BEFORE indicates that the amounts are for the year before the announcement year for accelerators and 2004 for non-accelerators. AFTER indicates that the amount is for the year after the announcement year. DIFFA is the AFTER minus BEFORE difference for accelerators. % ΔCA is the percentage change between after and before for the accelerating firm sample. DIFFB is the AFTER minus BEFORE difference for non-accelerators sample. % ΔCB is the percentage change between the before and after sample for the non-accelerators. DD is the difference between DIFFA-DIFFB. D% is the change in the percentage change between accelerators and non-accelerators (% ΔCA-% ΔCB). Amounts are in thousands of dollars. The significance level for the standard t-test (Wilcoxon test) for a significant difference in means (medians) is shown using asterisks in the upper (lower) row for each variable in the DIFFA, DIFFB and DD columns. 
